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The emergence of online political advertising has come with little
regulation. As a result, social media platforms provide venues for po-
litical advertising with little accountability attached. Where account-
ability for political speech is lacking, we may expect the speech to be
more divisive. This is particularly true for outside groups like Super
PACs and dark money groups, most of whom disappear after elec-
tions. In this work, we analyze how campaign finance disclosure and
microtargeting relate to the sentiment of political ads on Facebook.
We obtained 790,303 ads from Facebook’s political ad library that
ran between August-November 2018. We compare ads run by candi-
dates, parties, and two types of outside groups: those that disclose
their donors and those that are funded by dark money. Dark money
outside groups ran ads with the most negative sentiment on average,
whereas candidates ran ads with the most positive sentiment. Out-
side groups ran 62% of Facebook ads, with dark money ads outnum-
bering ads with more transparent campaign financing (3:2). A major-
ity of ads (63%) were microtargeted to less than 1000 Facebook users.
Outside groups used microtargeting to run ads that have more neg-
ative sentiment, and candidates and parties used it to run ads with
more positive sentiment. These results suggest that accountability
for speech matters. Microtargeting of online political advertisements
facilitates more extreme tone differences between outside groups
and candidates, and advertising by more transparent campaign or-
ganizations has more positive sentiment than advertising from less
transparent organizations.
Political Advertising | Facebook | Sentiment Analysis | Microtargeting |
Campaign Finance Transparency
Political advertisements on Facebook play an increasingand controversial role in U.S. elections. Facebook has
reported over $1.5 billion in political ad spending since May
2018 (1). However, the platform has come under scrutiny for
enabling advertising that spreads disinformation and furthers
polarization in society (2–4). For example, Russia targeted
undecided swing state voters in the 2016 election with negative
and deceptive ads on Facebook to sow discord and help elect
President Trump (5). These recent events have fueled dis-
cussions about a broader issue: the limited transparency and
accountability surrounding online political advertising (6–8).
In this work, we study the interaction of advertising sentiment
with two potential sources of accountability deficits: hidden
donors and microtargeting.
Current government regulations make it difficult to trace the
money behind many political advertisements, including those
on Facebook (9). In this era of unlimited outside spending,
outside groups, or groups that make political expenditures
independently of candidates, have accounted for increased
spending in every election while the transparency of their
donors has decreased (10). The majority of outside groups
also tend to disappear after one or two election cycles, which
makes them less accountable to the public than parties and
candidates, who cannot disappear (11).
Many outside groups evade accountability by not disclosing
their donors. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) and
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) require only some outside
groups such as political action committees (PACs) to disclose
their donors. Moreover, Citizens United allowed new types of
outside groups to make political expenditures, including 501(c)
“social welfare” organizations and limited-liability corporations
(LLCs). Transparency regulations for these groups has lagged,
and they are not required to disclose their donors. This
leads to dark money: political spending where the source
of money is unknown (12). Dark money also affects some
PACs, Hybrid PACs and Super PACs, which are otherwise
subject to disclosure laws, because when a dark money group
gives to one of these groups, the group’s donor list consists
of individual donors (disclosed) and dark money groups (no
donor disclosure). We often call this the gray money problem.
What is more, some groups running political ads on Facebook
do not register with the FEC or IRS at all. When advertisers
and donors are not identifiable, it is impossible for the public
to hold them accountable for their political speech.
Accountability problems in online political advertising can
emerge from another source too. Microtargeting enables adver-
tisers to target small groups of users based on demographics
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and interests inferred from online behavior. The microtarget-
ing of political ads is deeply unpopular with the public (13).
Ahead of the 2020 election, Google restricted microtargeting
while Twitter banned political ads altogether. Facebook, on
the other hand, continues to allow the microtargeting of po-
litical ads (14) and even permits advertisers to reach specific
users by name, phone number, or email (15). Proponents
of microtargeting argue that it allows advertisers and small
campaigns to speak directly to key voters. But since Facebook
does not fact-check ads (14), microtargeting also makes it
easier to single out susceptible voters with disinformation or
speech that triggers their underlying fears and suspicions. If
the microtargeted group is homogeneous enough, it is unlikely
that any ad viewer will “blow the whistle” on such disinfor-
mation, making microtargeting a potential avenue for speech
without accountability. Facebook does not release microtar-
geting criteria in its newly created political ad library (1, 15).
Retaining this information would enable counter-speech and
facilitate accountability (16).
How do campaign finance laws and microtargeting affect
the content and tone of political advertising on Facebook?
The existing literature suggests that political advertisers with
less transparency and accountability may be more willing to
address divisive issues and run negative messages. In fact,
several studies (17–19) have found that television and radio ad-
vertisers are more likely to use negative, divisive ads when they
conceal their donor information. The “backlash” effect, where
voters tend to have lower support for the sponsors of negative
ads, helps explain this phenomenon (20, 21). However, these
theories have not been tested in online political ads; there has
been little empirical research on Facebook ads so far because
its ad library is new and has many limitations (22, 23). Before
Facebook created its ad library, prior work estimated that the
majority of online advertisers were funded by dark money (4)
and used microtargeting (24) during the 2016 election. More
recently, an analysis of candidate ads from Facebook’s library
showed microtargeted ads from campaigns are less likely to
attack opponents than more broadly targeted ads (25). But an
open question remains as to how the majority of Facebook ad-
vertisers, whose funders are not disclosed, use microtargeting
and anonymity in their advertising.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to analyze Face-
book political ads across levels of advertiser transparency and
microtargeting. Specifically, we study the differences in ad
sentiment between Facebook political ads that have (or lack)
transparent sources of funding and which are (or are not)
microtargeted. Sentiment analysis is a natural language pro-
cessing technique which can quantify the polarity (positive,
neutral, negative) of advertising. In our work, we compare ad
sentiment across candidates, parties, and two types of outside
groups: those that have transparent donors, and those that
are funded by dark money. We also investigate differences in
sentiment between microtargeted and more broadly-targeted
ads using the number of impressions that the advertisement
receives. Our results show that Facebook political ads have
significantly different sentiment based on the accountability
features we have identified: group permanence, funding trans-
parency and microtargeting. The findings further suggest
that the intersection of microtargeting and transparency (or
its lack) explain ad sentiment more than an examination of
microtargeting alone. More transparent organizations (cam-
paigns and parties) use microtargeting to send more positive
messages, and less transparent organizations (outside groups)
use it to send more negative messages.
Results
We compare the sentiment of Facebook political ads across
(i) advertisers with varying campaign finance transparency,
and (ii) microtargeted and broadly-targeted ads. We collected
790,303 ads from 4,613 advertisers in Facebook’s political
ad archive that concerned federal races and issues and ran
during the 3-month window before the 2018 U.S. midterm
election.∗ This scope allows us to compare candidates, parties,
and outside groups governed by the same (federal) campaign
finance laws. As detailed in Materials and Methods, we define
dark money groups as advertisers that do not disclose their
donors to the FEC or IRS and microtargeted ads as having
fewer than 1000 impressions. The results are robust to different
definitions of dark money (Table S4-5), microtargeting (Table
S6), and the 60-day electioneering communications window
(Table S7).
Advertiser Frequency. We first report on the proportion of
ads that each advertiser type ran on Facebook during the 2018
election. Outside groups accounted for the majority of ads
(62%), with transparent outside groups representing 24% and
dark and gray money groups representing 38%. We found
that 85% of outside groups did not register with the FEC,
and that 50% of FEC-registered groups were newly created
in the 2018 election cycle. In addition, candidates accounted
for 21% of ads and parties represented the remaining 17%.
Turning to advertiser viewpoints, Democratic candidates ran
more ads than Republican candidates (58% to 42%), as did
liberal outside groups when compared to conservative outside
groups (61% to 39%). However, the Republican party ran
more ads than the Democratic party (68% to 32%). Table 1
reports the specific number of ads and advertisers for each
category.
Sentiment and Campaign Finance Disclosure. Next, we ana-
lyze the sentiment of ads across different advertiser types. We
calculated the sentiment of each ad on a scale of -1 (extreme
negative) to +1 (extreme positive), with an observed interquar-
tile range of [0.00 to 0.76]. Figure 1 shows the distribution of
sentiment and Table 1 reports the average† sentiment for each
advertiser type.
Candidates ran ads with the most positive sentiment on
average (0.46), whereas dark money outside groups ran ads
with the most negative sentiment (0.20). Independent samples
t-tests and Mann-Whitney U tests confirmed that candidates
had statistically higher sentiment (p < 0.0001) and that dark
money groups had statistically lower sentiment (p < 0.0001)
than all other advertiser types. Estimation of differences
in sentiment between parties (0.26) and transparent outside
groups (0.22) was sensitive to the test we chose, so we cannot
conclude that the difference is statistically significant.
∗The archive contained an additional 604,415 ads that did not concern federal races and issues
which we analyze in the SI. Table S2 finds similar results for the estimated 360,870 of these which
concerned state or local elections. We were unable to match the remaining 243,545 ads with
political advertiser data, but Facebook still included these ads in its archive; Table S3 shows that
most concerned surveys, political apparel, or solar promotions.
†The SI shows similar results for the interquartile range, median, and percentile (Tables S9-11).
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Fig. 1. Sentiment x Campaign Finance Disclosure. Candidates ran ads with the most positive sentiment, whereas dark money outside groups ran ads with the most
negative sentiment (p < 0.0001). Moreover, outside groups accounted for the majority of Facebook ads (62%) during the 2018 election, with dark money ads outnumbering ads
with more transparent campaign financing (3:2). We plot the distribution of ad sentiment for each advertiser type; bar heights represent ad frequency, circles denote means, and
center lines denote medians.
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Fig. 2. Ad Impressions and Microtargeting. A majority of ads for all advertiser
types obtained less than 1000 impressions. We consider these ads to be microtar-
geted given this is the smallest impressions estimate that Facebook provides. Parties
(88%) used microtargeting significantly more (p < 0.0001) than other advertiser types
(57-59%). Bar heights represent ad frequency.
We also analyze sentiment across different types of can-
didates, parties, and outside groups, as detailed in Table 1.
While Republicans and conservative outside groups ran more
positive ads than Democrats and liberal outside groups, the
pattern was reversed when the parties ran the ads (p < 0.0001).
These differences may be time-bound, given the focus on Presi-
dent Trump in the 2018 campaign. Among outside groups, ads
from transparent outside groups were slightly more positive
than ads from dark and gray money groups (p < 0.0001).
Advertiser Microtargeting. Advertisers used microtargeting in
63% of ads during the 2018 election. We consider an ad to be
microtargeted if it has less than 1000 impressions, which is the
smallest estimate provided by Facebook. Figure 2 compares
ad impressions and Table 1 reports the percentage of micro-
targeted ads for each advertiser type. 88% of party ads were
microtargeted, compared to about 60% for both candidates
and outside groups. In addition, Republican candidates (63%
to 57%), party committees (91% to 81%), and outside groups
(66% to 57%) all used microtargeting more often than their
Democratic counterparts.
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Fig. 3. Sentiment x Microtargeting. The sentiment of microtargeted ads was
significantly different (p < 0.0001) from the sentiment of non-microtargeted ads for all
advertiser types. Candidates and parties used more positive sentiment on average
when microtargeting, whereas outside groups used more negative sentiment. Bar
widths represent ad frequency, and error bars represent the 95% CI for the mean.
Sentiment and Microtargeting. We further compare the senti-
ment of microtargeted and non-microtargeted ads (Figure 3).
Microtargeted ads had more positive sentiment than non-
microtargeted ads for candidates (0.51 for microtargeted to
0.38 for non-microtargeted) and parties (0.27 to 0.18) on aver-
age. On the other hand, microtargeted ads had more negative
sentiment for transparent outside groups (0.21 to 0.25) and
dark money outside groups (0.18 to 0.22). T-tests and Mann-
Whitney U tests confirmed that the sentiment of microtargeted
ads significantly differed (p < 0.0001) from the sentiment of
non-microtargeted ads for all advertiser types.
Table 1 compares sentiment between microtargeted and non-
microtargeted ads for different types of candidates, parties, and
outside groups. Candidates and parties used microtargeting
to send more positive messages on average (p < 0.0001), with
especially large effects among Republican candidates (0.66
to 0.45) and the Democratic party (0.39 to 0.17). Outside
groups, however, used microtargeting to go more negative (p
< 0.0001), an effect driven by conservative groups (0.18 to
0.29). SI Tables S12-13 show specific differences in sentiment
for the top advertisers.
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Discussion
Our results show that political advertisers on Facebook pro-
duce ads with significantly different sentiment based on their
likelihood of being held accountable for their speech. Cam-
paign finance transparency and targeting choices correlate
with the tone of the ads that voters see.‡ However, we caution
that our findings adopt many of the limitations of Facebook’s
ad library.
Advertisers with less campaign finance disclosure ran more
negative ads. Outside groups, especially those funded by
dark money, ran ads with the most negative sentiment on
average. These results match previous studies (17–19) about
the negativity of outside groups on television and radio. But
in a stark difference from offline ads where candidates and
parties still dominate the airwaves (25), we found that outside
groups accounted for the majority (62%) of Facebook political
ads. Among outside group ads, dark money ads outnumbered
ads with more transparent campaign financing (3:2).
The larger volume and negativity of dark money ads on
Facebook suggests that stricter campaign finance disclosure
laws may affect the composition and tone of online adver-
tisers. Historically, negative political ads on television and
radio have been an effective way to persuade voters given
they tend to contain more factual information (20). But in
this online era, disinformation couched as advertising tends
to be more negative as well (16, 26), and several studies have
used sentiment analysis to predict so-called “fake news” on
social media (27, 28). Regardless of its credibility, negative
advertising on social media and its divisive nature have un-
doubtedly contributed to the political polarization of today’s
society (3, 4). Our work demonstrates that increased cam-
paign finance transparency may help curtail negativity in
online political advertising.
Microtargeted ads had different sentiment from ads with
broader targeting. This result suggests that advertisers may
change the content and tone of their ads when microtargeting.
In addition, different advertiser types appear to have different
microtargeting strategies: We found microtargeted ads had
more negative sentiment for outside groups and more posi-
tive sentiment for candidates and parties when compared to
more broadly-targeted ads. Recall that the majority (63%) of
political speech on Facebook is microtargeted.
Our analysis provides evidence for how microtargeting in-
teracts with the limited transparency and accountability sur-
rounding online political advertising. The Supreme Court
posits “counter-speech” as the best way to combat disinforma-
tive political speech (16). But if only small audiences view ads
with a certain sentiment or message, then the broad electorate
is unable to hear the speech and respond (8). Facebook’s
newly created ad library provides some transparency, however
counter-speech is not realistic if the audience for each ad is
not known to other advertisers.
Limitations and Future Work. As online political advertising
continues to grow, policymakers need guidance on adapting
campaign finance laws. This article provides an empirical
analysis of how dark money involvement and microtargeting –
‡ In the SI, we confirm these findings for different variations of our study, including using alternative
definitions of dark money, weighting ad sentiment by impressions, only using the 60-day election-
eering communications window, and with a regression framework (Tables S4-8).
two sources of limited transparency and accountability – affect
the content and tone of political ads in Facebook’s ad library
from the 2018 election. While the ad library increases the
ability of researchers to study online political ads, our work
also adopts many of its limitations.
First, we are beholden to Facebook’s definition of what
constitutes a political ad. We exclude approximately 43% of
ads because they did not concern federal races or issues, but
as we explain in the methods below, this is difficult to do
perfectly. Second, we define microtargeting by impressions
because Facebook does not release the individual targeting
criteria of each ad. For example, we cannot analyze specific
interest keywords used in microtargeting, which in the past
have included controversial topics such as “Jew haters” and
other bigoted categories (29). Facebook also does not provide
exact impressions data, and the majority of ads fall into the
smallest available estimate (<1000 impressions). Third, we
rely on the “Paid for by” label associated with each ad to
determine advertiser names and types. But during the 2018
election, Facebook did not prevent advertisers from providing
inconsistent, deceptive, or even missing advertiser names.§
We therefore may have incorrectly determined some advertiser
types, despite methods to limit errors as we discuss below.
Research on Facebook political ads is just beginning and
opportunities for future work abound. Here we study senti-
ment, and others have studied mentions of opponents (25),
but online ads also contain videos and images to be analyzed.
Within microtargeting strategies, some types are probably
more benign than others; the geographic dispersion of views
may indicate whether only geographic criteria were used (more
likely to be benign) or whether interests (including polarizing
keywords) were used to target. Cross-platform studies may
allow additional leverage: Google has restricted the ability
to microtarget but has not required additional transparency
of funders, allowing future researchers to further distinguish
between tone and sentiment from dark money groups who can
narrowly target (on Facebook) and who cannot (on Google).
Researchers can also examine the interaction between group
reputational concerns and advertising tone; here we observe
that party and campaigns ads are more positive, but data
on outside group persistence over time could help identify a
reputational dimension to advertisers’ sentiment choices, too.
Finally, this is a study of advertising during one midterm elec-
tion. Repeating it would help teach us how incumbency and
party control interact with transparency and microtargeting
over time.
Materials and Methods
Facebook Ads. We collected the complete set of 1,394,718
ads¶ released in Facebook’s political ad library (1) in the
3-month window before the 2018 U.S. election. We could
not obtain the data directly because of several issues with
Facebook’s API, including extreme limitations on query rates
and formats (22, 23). Instead, we acquired the data from
Harmony Labs, a third-party 501(c) organization that hosts
a database of continuously scraped data from Facebook’s ad
library (31). Our main analysis is limited to 790,303 ads and
§For example, Facebook allowed Vice News to run ads using the names of all 100 U.S. Senators
on the day before the 2018 election (30). Afterwards, Facebook started reviewing the “Paid for by”
labels, but we still found some inconsistent and deceptive labels as of the 2020 primary.
¶This count represents English ads with U.S. impressions and delivery between 8/6/18 and 11/6/18.
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4,613 advertisers that concerned federal races and issues in
order to compare advertisers governed by the same campaign
finance laws. After consulting with regulators and watchdog
groups, we decided to define these federal-scope advertisers as
those (i) registered with the FEC, (ii) running ads in multiple
states, or (iii) running ads mentioning federal candidates. Since
these criteria alone resulted in false positives, we also removed
advertiser names with state or local offices (e.g. “governor”,
“city council”, etc.).
Political Advertiser Data. In order to categorize advertisers,
we performed a many-to-one fuzzy match of advertiser names
between Facebook ad data and political advertiser data from
the Federal Election Commission (FEC) (32), Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS) (33, 34), Center for Responsive Politics
(CRP) (35), and OpenCorporates (36). We determined Face-
book advertiser names using the “Paid for by” label associated
with each ad. But as we noted earlier, Facebook did not
prevent advertisers from providing inconsistent, deceptive, or
even missing advertiser names during the 2018 elections (22).§
Therefore, we used a fuzzy match that involved normalizing
advertiser names to remove formatting and other sources of
inconsistencies.‖ We also manually verified all cases of adver-
tiser name collision, in addition to confirming all matches for
the top 2000 advertisers (93.2% of ads with federal-scope).∗∗
Finally, if the same Facebook account ran ads under multi-
ple advertiser names, then we assigned unmatched advertiser
names to the matched name associated with the most ads. We
provide a detailed step-by-step procedure to match Facebook
advertiser names and political advertiser data in the SI.
Advertiser Types. This work primarily considers 4 advertiser
types: candidates, parties, transparent outside groups, and
dark money outside groups. Using the political advertiser data
matched to each Facebook advertiser name, we first grouped
advertisers as follows:
• Candidates: candidate committees for U.S. President, Sen-
ate, or House of Representatives (registered with FEC).
• Parties: political party committees (registered with FEC).
• Outside Groups: PACs, Hybrid PACs, Super PACs, 501(c)
or 527 Organizations, or Corporations (registered with FEC,
IRS, or OpenCorporates)
Next, we distinguished between two types of outside groups:
those with transparent donors, and those funded by dark
money. The CRP tracks disclosure of donors for most outside
groups registered with the FEC (35). Using this information,
we classified outside groups as follows:
• Transparent: (i) verified by the CRP as having full disclo-
sure of donors; (ii) not verified by the CRP, but registered
with the FEC or as an IRS 527 organization.
• Dark Money: (i) verified by the CRP as having partial or
no disclosure of donors; (ii) not verified by the CRP, but
registered as a corporation or IRS 501(c) organization (and
not registered with the FEC or as an IRS 527 organization).
We further identified different types of candidates, parties,
and outside groups using the matched political advertiser
‖For example, Martha McSally’s 2018 Senate campaign registered with the FEC using the name
“MCSALLY FOR SENATE INC”. However, the campaign ran Facebook ads using the following
names: “McSally For Senate, Inc.”, “McSally for Senate Inc”, and “McSally for Senate”. Our nor-
malization procedure reduced all these names to “mcsally”.
∗∗Table S14 in the SI finds similar results for the top 2000 advertisers that we manually verified.
data. Among candidates, we distinguish by the office sought,
political party, and race status (challenger, incumbent, or
open seat). We also classify party committees as Republican
or Democratic. Lastly, we labeled outside groups among the
top 2000 advertisers†† as conservative or liberal based on the
content of their ads or, if available, CRP data on contributions
and expenditures.
Sentiment Computation. We calculated the sentiment of each
ad using the Valence Aware Dictionary and Sentiment Rea-
soner (VADER) in Python (37). VADER is a lexicon and
rule-based sentiment analysis tool specifically attuned to senti-
ments expressed in social media. In particular, it accounts for
unorthodox text in advertisements such as punctuation, slang,
acronyms, and emojis. Using VADER, we computed the over-
all sentiment of each ad on a scale of -1 (extreme negative) to
+1 (extreme positive).‡‡ This work limits sentiment analysis
to ad text; we do not consider images or videos used in ads.
Microtargeting Definition. We consider an ad to be microtar-
geted if it has less than 1000 impressions, which is the smallest
category that Facebook provides. Impressions count the num-
ber of times that an ad is on screen for the first time (38).
Facebook does not release specific microtargeting strategies
for each ad, such as whether the ad is targeted using segments,
interests, lookalike audiences, or user lists. However, Face-
book does cite the impressions estimate as a way to uncover
microtargeting in a Congressionally mandated audit (39).
Data and Code Availability. Data available through Harmony
Labs (31). Code and additional materials for this work are
available at: https://github.com/shomikj/facebook_ads.
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Table 1. Sentiment and Microtargeting by Advertiser Type
Advertiser Type
Count Average
Sentiment Microtargeted
Average Sentiment
x
Advertisements Advertisers Microtargeted Non-Microtargeted
All (Federal-Scope) 790,303 4,613 0.271 63.3% 0.274 0.264
Candidates 168,849 884 0.456 59.1% 0.511 0.376
Parties 131,208 99 0.257 88.1% 0.267 0.182
Transparent Outside Groups 191,354 756 0.224 59.2% 0.209 0.246
Dark Money Outside Groups 298,892 2,874 0.202 57.3% 0.185 0.225
C
an
di
da
te
s
Open 19,561 201 0.329 53.7% 0.353 0.301
Challenger 53,932 394 0.362 48.3% 0.382 0.343
Incumbent 95,356 289 0.535 66.3% 0.590 0.425
House 68,329 758 0.317 49.5% 0.340 0.294
Senate 50,874 122 0.396 56.9% 0.430 0.351
President 49,646 4 0.708 74.7% 0.731 0.642
Democratic 95,947 449 0.366 57.4% 0.394 0.328
Republican 69,193 361 0.583 62.8% 0.662 0.450
P
ar
tie
s Democratic 42,441 46 0.344 81.3% 0.385 0.167
Republican 88,717 44 0.215 91.4% 0.217 0.198
O
ut
si
de
G
ro
up
s
All Outside Groups 490,246 3,630 0.211 58.1% 0.195 0.233
PACs 66,863 172 0.350 67.4% 0.346 0.360
Hybrid PACs 46,544 50 0.098 60.1% 0.098 0.099
Super PACs 63,441 191 0.104 56.1% 0.071 0.147
501(c) Orgs 125,696 1,535 0.190 55.2% 0.180 0.203
Corporations 163,049 1,321 0.230 58.6% 0.199 0.272
Misc 527 Orgs 24,653 361 0.294 44.5% 0.272 0.311
Liberal 265,006 704 0.187 56.6% 0.188 0.186
Conservative 168,937 328 0.216 66.3% 0.180 0.287
Note: Table reports sentiment from -1 (negative) to +1 (positive) as average over ads and microtargeting as % of ads with <1000 impressions.
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